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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is an interlocutory appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(f) from the denial of class certification for medical 
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monitoring and property damage.  Plaintiffs aver chemical 
companies dumped an alleged carcinogen at an industrial 
complex near their residences.  The District Court found 
individual issues predominated on exposure, causation, and 
the need for medical monitoring and also found individual 
issues predominated as to a liability-only issue class for the 
property damage claims. 
I. 
Named plaintiffs Glenn and Donna Gates are residents 
of McCullom Lake Village, Illinois, a primarily residential 
area of approximately 2000 people and 400 homes.  
Defendants are chemical companies that owned and operated 
a facility in Ringwood, Illinois, one mile north of McCullom 
Lake Village.  According to plaintiffs, defendants dumped 
wastewater containing vinylidene chloride into a nearby 
lagoon that seeped into an underground aquifer where it 
degraded into vinyl chloride, a carcinogen.  Plaintiffs contend 
vinyl chloride evaporated into the air from the shallow aquifer 
and was swept by the wind over McCullom Lake Village.   
Plaintiffs seek certification of two classes:  (1) a class 
seeking medical monitoring for village residents exposed to 
the airborne vinyl chloride between 1968 and 2002, and (2) a 
liability-only issue class seeking compensation for property 
damage from the exposure.  At issue is whether the District 
Court erred in finding individual issues barred certification of 
the proposed trial classes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) or 
23(b)(3).  We will affirm. 
A. 
 From 1951 to 2005, defendant Morton International 
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owned and operated the Ringwood facility.  In June 1999, 
defendant Rohm & Haas Co. acquired Morton and from 2005, 
defendant Rohm & Haas Chemicals, LLC, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Rohm & Haas Co., has operated the Ringwood 
facility.
1
   
 Morton made use of vinylidene chloride at the 
Ringwood facility and from 1960 to 1978, disposed 
wastewater containing vinylidene chloride into an on-site 
lagoon.  In 1973, tests of the shallow aquifer under the 
Ringwood facility showed elevated levels of ammonia and 
chloride.  This shallow aquifer does not extend under 
McCullom Lake Village.  In 1978, Morton ceased using the 
on-site lagoon and covered it.  
 In 1984, Morton conducted an environmental 
assessment of the Ringwood facility and installed nineteen 
monitoring wells at the facility.  Samples from these wells 
contained vinylidene chloride and vinyl chloride.  
Subsequently, more than ninety monitoring wells were 
installed in the area around the Ringwood facility.
2
  To date, 
neither vinylidene chloride nor vinyl chloride has been 
detected in tests of residential wells in McCullom Lake 
Village used to obtain drinking water.  Plaintiffs contend 
                                              
1
Additional defendants Huntsman and Huntsman 
Polyurethanes were dismissed by stipulation without 
prejudice and defendant Modine reached a class settlement 
that the District Court approved.   
2
In 1991, Morton voluntarily enrolled the Ringwood facility 
in the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency‟s 
remediation program, an ongoing process.  The remediation 
plan for the shallow aquifer involves using wells and a 
wastewater treatment plant to decontaminate the water.   
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these chemicals may be present at undetectable levels. 
B. 
 In 2006, named plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging 
there were multiple pathways of contamination from multiple 
chemicals including vinyl chloride.
3
  The putative classes 
include only those with economic injury or exposure.  
Persons alleging physical injury (including brain cancer) are 
excluded from the classes.   
Despite asserting multiple potential pathways of 
contamination, plaintiffs limited their arguments at class 
certification to a single chemical, vinyl chloride, and a single 
pathway, via a shallow aquifer into the air.  A deeper aquifer 
runs underneath the Ringwood facility, but the parties dispute 
whether it has become contaminated and whether the aquifer 
flows to the village.  Plaintiffs originally alleged this deeper 
aquifer (“deeper plume”) carried vinyl chloride to the ground 
water under the village.  They also alleged “air stripping” 
equipment used to remove contamination from the facility‟s 
groundwater caused contaminants to be released into the air. 
Despite asserting several claims for relief including 
medical monitoring, property damage claims, relief under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., the 
Illinois Environmental Protection Act, 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 
5/1 et seq., and state-law fraudulent misrepresentation and 
willful and wanton misconduct claims, plaintiffs chose to 
proceed on a class basis only on the medical monitoring and 
                                              
3
The other contaminants included trichloroethylene (TCE), 
and 1, 1-Dichloroethylene (DCE) both industrial solvents.   
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property damage claims and, as noted, solely with regard to 
vinyl chloride exposure.  The proposed medical monitoring 
class includes: 
All individuals who lived for one year or more 
in total (whether consecutively or not) within 
McCullom Lake Village during the time period 
from January 1, 1968 to December 31, 2002.  
Excluded from the class are individuals for 
whom brain cancer has been detected and 
individuals bringing claims in any court of 
competent jurisdiction arising out of exposure 
to chlorinated solvents. 
The proposed property damage class includes: 
All persons who presently own real property 
within McCullom Lake Village, or who owned 
real property within McCullom Lake Village as 
of April 25, 2006 (the date of the filing of the 
complaint) through the present.  Excluded from 
the Class are individuals who have already 
brought claims in any court of competent 
jurisdiction arising out of exposure to 
chlorinated solvents. 
Plaintiffs sought certification of only these classes. 
 At the class certification hearing both parties submitted 
expert evidence.
4
  Plaintiffs relied on a report from Paolo 
                                              
4
By stipulation the parties agreed to delay consideration of a 
pending omnibus Daubert motion regarding their proposed 
experts.  In the interim, we decided In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
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Zannetti and a report and testimony from Gary Ginsberg.  
Zannetti, an expert in modeling dispersion of air pollution, 
submitted a report estimating the dispersion of vinyl chloride 
over the village based on data from the monitoring wells.  
Ginsberg, a toxicologist at the Connecticut Department of 
Public Health, presented a risk assessment of exposure to 
vinyl chloride.  
  To measure the exposure from pollutants such as vinyl 
chloride, the experts modeled the exposure of residents 
compared to their background levels of exposure absent the 
alleged pollution attributable to the defendants.
5
  Plaintiffs 
contend the natural background level is 0.042 micrograms per 
cubic meter (“µ/m3”), a measure contained in the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency‟s 1999 National-Scale Air 
Toxics Assessment.  
Zannetti‟s report modeled the emissions over the 
                                                                                                     
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008), which required a 
“rigorous analysis” of the proposed classes in light of the 
requirements for class certification.  Id. at 309.  The District 
Court ordered supplementary briefing and informed the 
parties that they may need to address the reliability of expert 
evidence to the extent it related to class certification issues.  
The District Court‟s analysis turned largely on whether the 
experts‟ opinions qualified as common proof and not whether 
their methods were reliable. 
5
Exposure is compared to background levels unless the 
defendant‟s contamination is so severe that it alters the 
baseline background level.  See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB 
Litig., 113 F.3d 444, 461 (3d Cir. 1997).  The District Court 
found the expert testimony did not meet that standard and 
plaintiffs do not challenge that finding on appeal. 
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village using data from monitoring wells to develop models 
for the concentration of vinyl chloride in the air during four 
time periods, 1940-67, 1968-89, 1990-96, and 1997-2006.  
Included in his report are maps of the village with isopleth 
lines
6
 showing the concentration of vinyl chloride exposure 
for persons within the isopleth during each time period.  The 
isopleths are based on his “high scenario,” which was an 
estimate based on the highest single recorded concentration at 
each monitoring site.  He also developed a scenario he termed 
the “low scenario,” which extrapolated exposure from the 
average of all recorded concentrations at each site.  Zannetti 
used the highest recorded data because, in his opinion, the 
contamination had ended by the time the monitoring began 
and the historical levels were expected to be significantly 
higher than those measured.  The exposure at the part of the 
village closest to the shallow plume ranged from 0.0266 µ/m3 
to 0.210 µ/m3 in the “high scenario” and 0.00554 µ/m3 to 
0.0159 µ/m3 in the “low scenario.”7   
                                              
6
Isopleths are lines on a map joining points of equal value to 
show distributions of a specific variable, such as the use of 
contour lines on a topographical map to show elevation.  The 
isopleth lines here demark areas in and around the village 
where the estimated concentration of vinyl chloride within the 
line equals or exceeds the stated value. 
7
Three isopleth maps show the concentration during the class 
period.  The isopleth modeling the high emission scenario 
from 1968 to 1989 shows a small fraction of the Village in an 
isopleth of 0.20 µ/m3 with the remainder of the Village in an 
isopleth of 0.08 µ/m3.  The isopleth of the period from 1990 
to 1996 shows a significant portion of the Village in an 
isopleth of 0.08 µ/m3 and the rest in an isopleth of 0.022 
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Ginsberg testified that the average amount of exposure 
for residents of the village over a twenty-five year period 
from the shallow plume would be 0.127 µ/m3 (in addition to 
any background exposure).  Ginsberg arrived at this figure by 
averaging the concentrations in Zannetti‟s isopleths based on 
the “high scenario.”8  The “high scenario” extrapolated 
exposure levels based on maximum detected concentration at 
monitoring wells from 1985 to 1990.  He used the “high 
scenario” because “the contamination was likely higher in the 
past.”  In his view, the scenario still probably underestimated 
the exposure.  If the “low scenario” were used the average 
exposure for a twenty-five year period would be 0.011 µ/m3.  
Ginsberg disclaimed that his report
9
 was conclusive as 
                                                                                                     
µ/m3.  The last isopleth map showing the period from 1997 to 
2006 shows a minority of the village in an isopleth of 0.026 
µ/m3 and the remainder in an isopleth of 0.008 µ/m3. 
8
The District Court noted Ginsberg described his calculation 
of the 0.127 figure “in two different, contradictory ways” at 
the hearing and during his deposition.  At his deposition 
Ginsberg testified he used Zannetti‟s “high scenario” which is 
calculated only for the point of the Village closest to the 
plume.  But at the hearing, Ginsberg testified he averaged the 
two ends of the isopleth distribution—the point closest to the 
contamination and the point at the furthest end of the village.  
The District Court found that either explanation would not 
change the fact the number represents an average of class 
members‟ exposure. 
9The bulk of Ginsberg‟s report provides a detailed analysis of 
the carcinogenic nature of vinyl chloride.  The defendants 
dispute whether vinyl chloride poses a cancer risk to humans.  
We need not address the issue as it presents a merits 
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to individual cases.  At one point during his hearing 
testimony, Ginsberg stated the hypothetical risk calculations 
are “not meant to predict risk for a single individual under 
any specific scenario”  because of “individual or personal 
variability—susceptibility.”  
The District Court denied class certification for both 
classes.  It found the medical monitoring class lacked the 
cohesiveness needed to maintain a class under Rule 23(b)(2) 
and that common issues of law and fact did not predominate 
as required under Rule 23(b)(3).  Both failed for the same 
reason—the “common” evidence proposed for trial did not 
adequately typify the specific individuals that composed the 
two classes.  The court also found the remaining individual 
issues would require trial, undoing any efficiencies of class 
proceedings and possibly leading a second jury to reconsider 
evidence presented to the jury in the class proceeding.  
The court found plaintiffs failed to present common 
proof of three issues critical to recovering on the medical 
monitoring claim—(1) that plaintiffs suffered from exposure 
greater than normal background levels, (2) the proximate 
result of which is significantly increased risk of developing a 
serious disease, and (3) whether the proposed medical 
monitoring regime is reasonably medically necessary. 
The court found the proposed expert evidence 
demonstrating the first element—exposure greater than 
normal background levels—did not reflect the exposure of 
any specified individuals within the class.  The court rejected 
Ginsberg‟s risk analysis and use of the 0.127 µ/m3 figure 
                                                                                                     
determination that does not alter the analysis of the propriety 
of class certification. 
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because it represented an average exposure, not the exposure 
of any actual class member.  The court also rejected as 
insufficient Zannetti‟s isopleths because the maps assumed a 
constant value for exposure during lengthy time periods.  It 
found the isopleths were “overly simplistic” and averaged the 
class members‟ exposures, rendering them unsuitable as 
common proof. 
The court found no common proof of minimum 
exposure level above which class members were at an 
increased risk of serious disease.  The court rejected the 
proposed value of 0.07 µ/m3—the EPA‟s regulatory standard 
for exposure to a mixed population of children and adults—
because 0.07 µ/m3 is a precautionary value below which a 
mixed population is likely to be safe.  It does not establish the 
converse, the required element—the point at which class 
members would likely be at risk. 
The court doubted that putative “common” proof could 
demonstrate whether the proposed monitoring regime is 
reasonably medically necessary.  Plaintiffs wanted class 
members to receive serial MRIs to scan for cancerous tumors 
or CAT scans, if MRIs would pose health risks.  The court 
did not believe a regime could be developed using common 
proof because of class members‟ differing ages, medical 
histories, genetic predispositions, and tolerance of serial 
MRIs.  
The court also denied certification of the property 
damage class, finding similar defects with the “common” 
proof.  The court noted “[p]laintiffs rely on the same expert 
testimony that they offered to support their medical 
monitoring claim.”  The court refused to certify a liability-
only class because the common evidence could not establish 
12 
 
contamination at each property that was attributable to the 
defendants.   
II. 
The District Court‟s reasoned analysis of the denial of 
class certification makes clear it did not abuse its discretion.  
“Factual determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings 
must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.”  
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320.  We review the District 
Court‟s findings for abuse of discretion.  Id. at 312.  A district 
court abuses its discretion if its “decision rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
improper application of law to fact.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Plaintiffs sought certification of the medical 
monitoring class under either Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3).  We 
will first address denial of class certification under Rule 
23(b)(2). 
A. 
Rule 23(b)(2) applies when “the party opposing the 
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the 
class as a whole.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).  The Supreme 
Court recently clarified “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a 
single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide 
relief to each member of the class.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. 
Dukes, --- U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011). Rule 
23(b)(2), in contrast to (b)(3), “does not authorize class 
certification when each class member would be entitled to an 
individualized award of monetary damages.”  Id.  But the 
Court did not conclusively decide “whether there are any 
13 
 
forms of „incidental‟ monetary relief that are consistent with 
the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) we have announced and 
that comply with the Due Process Clause.”  Id. at 2561. 
1. 
Medical monitoring cannot be easily categorized as 
injunctive or monetary relief.  A medical monitoring cause of 
action allows those exposed to toxic substances to recover the 
costs of periodic medical appointments and the costs of tests 
to detect the early signs of diseases associated with exposure.   
The few states that recognize medical monitoring as a remedy 
recognize it as a cause of action, like Pennsylvania, Redland 
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 142 
(Pa. 1997), or treat it as a type of relief granted in connection 
with a traditional tort cause of action, see, e.g., Bourgeois v. 
A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So.2d 355, 359 (La. 1998).
10
  
                                              
10
See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.04 
reporter‟s notes cmt. b, at 124 (2010) (“As a matter of 
substantive law, courts are split on the viability of, and proper 
approach to medical monitoring actions.”); 7AA Charles Alan 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice 
& Procedure § 1775, at 55-56 (3d ed. 2005) (“One type of 
order about which there is some disagreement in the courts is 
a request for medical monitoring.  Some courts have deemed 
that request the equivalent of one for an injunction; others 
have treated it as a form of damage relief.” (footnote 
omitted)); 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class 
Actions: Law and Practice § 5:18, at 5-70 (3d ed. 2006) 
(“Medical monitoring is a controversial, cutting-edge concept 
that has not undergone widespread scrutiny in the state courts, 
let alone gained widespread acceptance.”).  Only a handful of 
states have allowed plaintiffs to recover the costs of medical 
14 
 
The remedy of medical monitoring has divided courts on 
whether plaintiffs should proceed under Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 
23(b)(3).
11
  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has endorsed 
awarding medical monitoring damages as a trust fund which 
“compensates the plaintiff for only the monitoring costs 
actually incurred.”  Redland Soccer Club, 696 A.2d at 142 
n.6.  It has not yet decided whether medical monitoring 
awards can be in the form of a lump-sum verdict.  Id.  We 
have previously reviewed the certification of a Pennsylvania-
law medical monitoring class under Rule 23(b)(2) without 
comment on whether medical monitoring claims are 
predominately claims for injunctive or monetary relief.  See 
Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 
1998).   
The District Court here denied certification under both 
                                                                                                     
monitoring without other physical injury.  See Burns v. 
Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33-34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1987); Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 
795, 822-23 (Cal. 1993); Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 
287, 314 (N.J. 1987); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 142 (Pa. 1997); Hansen v. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979-80 (Utah 1993); Bower v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 429-30 (W.Va. 
1999); see also Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 
715, 720 (Mich. 1992) (recognizing threats or impending 
threats to health as actionable under a private nuisance cause 
of action). 
11
Compare, e.g., Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 827 
(10th Cir. 1995) with Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst. Inc., 
253 F.3d 1180, 1194-96, amended, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
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subsections for reasons unrelated to the injunctive or 
monetary nature of the relief sought.  In light of the Supreme 
Court‟s recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, --- 
U.S. ----, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), we question whether the 
kind of medical monitoring sought here can be certified under 
Rule 23(b)(2) but we do not reach the issue.  As noted, the 
Court held “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single 
injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to 
each member of the class”  but left open the question 
“whether there are any forms of „incidental‟ monetary relief 
that are consistent with the interpretation of Rule 23(b)(2) we 
have announced and that comply with the Due Process 
Clause.”  Id. at 2557, 2561 (quoting Allison v. Citgo 
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998)).  If the 
plaintiffs prevail, class members‟ regimes of medical 
screenings and the corresponding cost will vary individual by 
individual.  But we need not determine whether the monetary 
aspects of plaintiffs‟ medical monitoring claims are incidental 
to the grant of injunctive or declaratory relief.  “[A] single 
injunction or declaratory judgment” cannot “provide relief to 
each member of the class” proposed here, id. at 2557, due to 
individual issues unrelated to the monetary nature of the 
claim.  For its part, the District Court found certification 
improper under either category for reasons apart from the 
monetary nature of plaintiffs‟ claims. 
2. 
Although Rule 23(b)(2) classes need not meet the 
additional predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 
23(b)(3), “it is well established that the class claims must be 
cohesive.”  Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143.  Rule 23(b)(2) requires 
that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 
on grounds that apply generally to the class.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
16 
 
23(b)(2).  “The key to the (b)(2) class is „the indivisible 
nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the 
notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or 
declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to 
none of them.‟”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 
(quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age 
of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)).  
“Indeed, a (b)(2) class may require more cohesiveness than a 
(b)(3) class.”  Barnes, 161 F.3d at 142.12   
As all class members will be bound by a single 
judgment, members of a proposed Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive or 
declaratory class must have strong commonality of interests.  
The Supreme Court in Wal-Mart recently highlighted the 
importance of cohesiveness in light of the limited protections 
for absent class members under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2): 
Classes certified under (b)(1) and (b)(2) share 
the most traditional justifications for class 
treatment—that individual adjudications would 
be impossible or unworkable, as in a (b)(1) 
                                              
12
Commentators have noted that certification requirements 
under Rule 23(b)(2) are more stringent than under (b)(3).  See 
7AA Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1784.1, at 343 (3d 
ed. 2005) (“[T]he common-question and superiority standards 
of Rule 23(b)(3) are in some ways much less demanding than 
that of either Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) . . . .”); see also 1 
Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions:  Law 
and Practice § 5:15, at 5-57 (3d ed. 2006) (“[I]t is well 
established that a rule 23(b)(2) class should actually have 
more cohesiveness than a Rule 23(b)(3) class.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
17 
 
class, or that the relief sought must perforce 
affect the entire class at once, as in a (b)(2) 
class. For that reason these are also mandatory 
classes: The Rule provides no opportunity for 
(b)(1) or (b)(2) class members to opt out, and 
does not even oblige the District Court to afford 
them notice of the action. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2558 (footnote omitted).  
The “disparate factual circumstances of class members” may 
prevent a class from being cohesive and, therefore, make the 
class unable to be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).  Carter v. 
Butz, 479 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d Cir. 1973).   
Because causation and medical necessity often require 
individual proof, medical monitoring classes may founder for 
lack of cohesion.  See In re St. Jude Med. Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 
1122 (8th Cir. 2005); Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 
713, 727-28 (6th Cir. 2004); Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 
Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1195-96, amended, 273 F.3d 1266 (9th 
Cir. 2001); Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143-46; Boughton v. Cotter 
Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 827 (10th Cir. 1995).  Rule 23(b)(2) 
“does not authorize class certification when each class 
member would be entitled to an individualized award of 
monetary damages.”13  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. 
The District Court found individual issues were 
significant to certain elements of the medical monitoring 
claims here.  To prevail on a medical monitoring claim under 
                                              
13
As noted, the Court left open whether monetary awards 
incidental to the grant of declaratory or injunctive relief were 
permissible.  Id. at 2561. 
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Pennsylvania law,
14
 plaintiffs must prove: 
(1) exposure greater than normal background 
levels; 
(2) to a proven hazardous substance; 
(3) caused by the defendant‟s negligence; 
(4) as a proximate result of the exposure, 
plaintiff has a significantly increased risk of 
contracting a serious latent disease; 
(5) a monitoring procedure exists that makes the 
early detection of the disease possible; 
(6) the prescribed monitoring regime is different 
from that normally recommended in the absence 
of the exposure; and 
(7) the prescribed monitoring regime is 
reasonably necessary according to 
contemporary scientific principles. 
 
Redland Soccer Club, 696 A.2d at 145-46.  “Expert testimony 
is required to prove these elements.”  Sheridan v. NGK 
Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 251 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
Redland Soccer Club, 696 A.2d at 145-46).  The District 
Court identified individual issues that would eclipse common 
issues in at least three of the required elements, noting several 
potential variations in proving exposure above background, a 
significantly increased risk of a serious latent disease, and the 
reasonable necessity of the monitoring regime.  Plaintiffs 
                                              
14
Neither party challenges the trial court‟s conclusion that 
Pennsylvania law applies or that, if Illinois law applied, the 
Illinois Supreme Court would adopt a cause of action for 
medical monitoring with the same essential elements as 
Pennsylvania law. 
19 
 
contend the court misinterpreted and improperly evaluated the 
evidence on the merits, rather than under a class certification 
standard, an error compounded by the parties‟ stipulation that 
consideration of Daubert issues would be put off until after 
class certification.  
3. 
The District Court did not err in considering whether 
the proposed common proof would accurately reflect the 
exposure of individual members of the class to vinyl 
chloride.
15
  “Frequently the „rigorous analysis‟ will entail 
some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff‟s underlying 
claim.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.  “[T]he 
court may „consider the substantive elements of the plaintiffs‟ 
case in order to envision the form that a trial on those issues 
would take.‟”  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317 (quoting 
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 
F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
Plaintiffs proposed to show the exposure of class 
members through the expert opinions of Zannetti and 
Ginsberg.  On appeal, plaintiffs contend the court failed to 
concentrate on Zannetti‟s isopleths and failed to recognize 
that the isopleths provide average exposure per person, not a 
class-wide average across class members. 
                                              
15
Plaintiffs were aware that the issues of class certification 
were linked to the merits of their claims.  In their reply brief 
to the District Court, plaintiffs stated “[a]lthough typically a 
party moving for class certification need not present expert 
opinions on the merits (as opposed to the experts‟ proposed 
methodologies), in this case, merits and certification are 
closely linked.” 
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The District Court found that the isopleths could not 
constitute common proof of exposure above background 
levels.  It noted several problems—that the isopleths only 
showed average daily exposure, not minimum exposure, used 
average exposure over very long periods of time when 
exposure likely varied, and could not show that every class 
member was exposed above background.
16
 
Instead of showing the exposure of the class member 
with the least amount of exposure, plaintiffs‟ proof would 
show only the amount that hypothetical residents of the 
village would have been exposed to under a uniform set of 
assumptions without accounting for differences in exposure 
year-by-year or based upon an individual‟s characteristics.  At 
most, the isopleths show the exposure only of persons who 
lived in the village for the entire period the isopleth represents 
and who behaved according to all assumptions that Zannetti 
made in creating the isopleth. 
Plaintiffs cannot substitute evidence of exposure of 
actual class members with evidence of hypothetical, 
composite persons in order to gain class certification.  Cf. 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.02 cmt. d, 
at 89 (2010) (“Aggregate treatment is thus possible when a 
trial would allow for the presentation of evidence sufficient to 
demonstrate the validity or invalidity of all claims with 
respect to a common issue under applicable substantive law, 
                                              
16
While plaintiffs argue the court committed error by 
describing their evidence as “averages,” plaintiffs themselves 
stated in their reply brief to the District Court that “[p]laintiffs 
will prove that daily average levels of vinyl chloride during 
the defined periods of time migrated from defendants‟ 
manufacturing sites to the Village.”  (emphasis added).   
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without altering the substantive standard that would be 
applied were each claim to be tried independently and without 
compromising the ability of the defendant to dispute 
allegations made by claimants or to raise pertinent substantive 
defenses.”).  The evidence here is not “common” because it is 
not shared by all (possibly even most) individuals in the class.  
Averages or community-wide estimations would not be 
probative of any individual‟s claim because any one class 
member may have an exposure level well above or below the 
average. 
Attempts to meet the burden of proof using modeling 
and assumptions that do not reflect the individual 
characteristics of class members have been met with 
skepticism.  See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 
(5th Cir. 1990) (“It is evident that these statistical estimates 
deal only with general causation, for population-based 
probability estimates do not speak to a probability of 
causation in any one case; the estimate of relative risk is a 
property of the studied population, not of an individual‟s 
case.” (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original)); In 
re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 
145, 165 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that “generic causation and 
individual circumstances concerning each plaintiff and his or 
her exposure to Agent Orange . . . appear to be inextricably 
intertwined” and expressing concern that if the class had been 
certified for trial “the class action would have allowed generic 
causation to be determined without regard to those 
characteristics and the individual‟s exposure”); see also 2 
Joseph M. McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law 
and Practice § 8:9, at 8-55 to -57 (3d ed. 2006) (“Permitting a 
class to proceed with its suit without linking its proof to even 
a single class member would contravene the overwhelming 
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authority recognizing the individualized nature of the 
causation inquiry in mass tort cases.”).   
 There are several reasons the amount of vinyl chloride 
exposure for class members  would differ from the exposure 
estimated by Zannetti‟s isopleths.  Levels of vinyl chloride 
varied within the periods the isopleth measures.  Zannetti 
assumes one constant level of exposure for 1968 to 1989, 
another for 1990 to 1996 and a third for 1997 to 2006.  But 
another part of Zannetti‟s report notes the temporal level of 
exposure varied drastically—even hourly.  He states “hourly 
concentration impacts are frequently one order of magnitude 
(i.e., 10 times) greater and even two orders of magnitude (i.e., 
100 times) greater than the annual average.”  The implication 
of Zannetti‟s statement is that for the average to be at the 
calculated level there would be periods when the 
concentration would be significantly lower than the period 
average, in addition to the periods when the concentration is 
significantly higher.  This fluctuation makes the specific 
period of time and amount of time class members were in the 
village critical in deciding whether they were exposed to 
higher than background levels.  As the court noted, within 
each of these periods, the exposure varied and only persons 
residing within the village the entire period would have their 
personal average exposure equal the average exposure within 
the isopleth lines.   
 Plaintiffs‟ experts contended that, because the 
dumping of vinylidene chloride stopped in 1978, the 
concentration of vinyl chloride fell during much of the class 
period.  But under the plaintiffs‟ proposed modeling and 
isopleths, a class member who lived in the village from 1988-
89—a full decade after the dumping ended—would be 
assumed to have been exposed to the same concentration of 
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vinyl chloride as a person living in the same neighborhood 
from 1968-69 when dumping occurred. 
 Moreover, the isopleths do not reflect that different 
persons may have different levels of exposure based on 
biological factors or individual activities over the class 
period.  Factors which affect a person‟s exposure to toxins 
can include activity level, age, sex, and genetic make-up.  See 
Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence 430 (2d ed. 2000).  On cross-examination, Ginsberg 
stated that “[s]ome people will have higher breathing rates per 
body weight, et cetera,” which would create a disparity 
between the concentrations of vinyl chloride (based on 
estimated exposure as opposed to actual exposure). 
Each person‟s work, travel, and recreational habits 
may have affected their level of exposure to vinyl chloride.  
Ginsberg admitted that differences in the amount of time 
spent outside the village would create different average 
concentrations to which the class members were exposed.  A 
person who worked outside the village would have been 
exposed less than a stay-at-home parent, or retiree.  The 
isopleths assume exposure to the same concentration for class 
members who may have spent very different amounts of time 
in the village.   
Plaintiffs argue unconvincingly that the isopleths 
reflect average exposure of individuals rather than a 
classwide average.  They contend the isopleth represents a 
concentration which is the “least exposure of anyone within 
the area circumscribed by the isopleth line.”  But one cannot 
evaluate the accuracy of this claim unless plaintiffs presented 
some way to measure the actual minimum levels of exposure 
of individual class members.  Plaintiffs‟ model assumes away 
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relevant variations between the hundreds of residents within 
the same isopleth lines that would result in exposure to 
different concentrations of vinyl chloride.
17
  Their model does 
not provide individual average exposures of actual class 
members.  
4. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding plaintiffs would be unable to prove a concentration of 
vinyl chloride that would create a significant risk of 
contracting a serious latent disease for all class members.  
Nor was there common proof that could establish the danger 
point for all class members.   
 The court identified two problems with the proposed 
evidence.  First, it rejected the plaintiffs‟ proposed 
threshold—exposure above 0.07 µ/m3, developed as a 
regulatory threshold by the EPA for mixed populations of 
adults and children—as a proper standard for determining 
liability under tort law.  Second, the court correctly noted, 
even if the 0.07 µ/m3 standard were a correct measurement of 
the aggregate threshold, it would not be the threshold for each 
class member who may be more or less susceptible to 
diseases from exposure to vinyl chloride.
18
 
                                              
17Zannetti‟s report does not list the assumptions made that 
would affect the concentration of exposure, such as the 
amount of time spent in the village.  Ginsberg, in reaching his 
average, assumed the residents were present 350 days in a 
year for 24 hours-a-day, 7 days-a-week for twenty-five years. 
18Plaintiffs‟ experts agreed risk levels varied by individual.  
Melissa Neiman, a board certified neurosurgeon, noted 
25 
 
 Although the positions of regulatory policymakers are 
relevant, their risk assessments are not necessarily conclusive 
in determining what risk exposure presents to specified 
individuals.  See Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual 
on Scientific Evidence 413 (2d ed. 2000) (“While risk 
assessment information about a chemical can be somewhat 
useful in a toxic tort case, at least in terms of setting 
reasonable boundaries as to the likelihood of causation, the 
impetus for the development of risk assessment has been the 
regulatory process, which has different goals.”); id. at 423 
(“Particularly problematic are generalizations made in 
personal injury litigation from regulatory positions. . . . [I]f 
regulatory standards are discussed in toxic tort cases to 
provide a reference point for assessing exposure levels, it 
must be recognized that there is a great deal of variability in 
the extent of evidence required to support different 
regulations.”).  
                                                                                                     
“[i]ndividuals in the class will likely have varying degrees of 
risk regarding the development of brain tumors,” although in 
her opinion all exposed persons would have a higher risk than 
the average non-exposed person. Ginsberg‟s report states 
exposure to vinyl chloride has “greater cancer effects in early 
life for liver and other tumor sites.”  Therefore, exposure at 
the screening target of 0.07 µ/m3 used for “mixed 
populations” may pose little risk for healthy adults, but may 
pose a great risk for children.  For example, Ginsberg testified 
that EPA Region 3 considers 0.16 µ/m3 as the “de minimis 
risk threshold” but, according to Ginsberg, the EPA uses “a 
lower screening level [the 0.07 µ/m3 standard] for 
community risk if it‟s a mixed population, meaning young 
children and adults.” 
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Thus, plaintiffs could not carry their burden of proof 
for a class of specific persons simply by citing regulatory 
standards for the population as a whole.  Cf. Wright v. 
Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(“Whatever may be the considerations that ought to guide a 
legislature in its determination of what the general good 
requires, courts and juries, in deciding cases, traditionally 
make more particularized inquiries into matters of cause and 
effect.”).       
Plaintiffs have failed to propose a method of proving 
the proper point where exposure to vinyl chloride presents a 
significant risk of developing a serious latent disease for each 
class member.  Plaintiffs propose a single concentration 
without accounting for the age of the class member being 
exposed, the length of exposure, other individual factors such 
as medical history, or showing the exposure was so toxic that 
such individual factors are irrelevant.  The court did not abuse 
its discretion in concluding individual issues on this point 
make trial as a class unfeasible, defeating cohesion. 
5. 
 Nor did the court abuse its discretion in determining 
individual issues defeat cohesion with respect to whether the 
proposed monitoring regime is reasonably medically 
necessary.  We have been skeptical that the necessity for 
individuals‟ medical monitoring regimes can be proven on a 
class basis.  See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 146 (“Although the 
general public‟s monitoring program can be proved on a 
classwide basis, an individual‟s monitoring program by 
definition cannot.”); see Principles of the Law of Aggregate 
Litigation § 2.04 reporter‟s notes cmt. b, at 126 (2010) 
(“[A]fter Barnes, courts often have withheld class 
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certification for medical monitoring due to the presence of 
individualized issues . . . .”).  Plaintiffs‟ proposed common 
evidence and trial plan do not resolve any of the issues in 
proving medical necessity on an aggregate basis. 
The District Court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs‟ 
conclusory allegation they could prove the need for serial 
MRIs on a classwide basis.  There were conflicting expert 
reports.  Ginsberg‟s report contended class members were at 
increased risk due to exposure but did not discuss possible 
monitoring and treatment regimes.  Melissa Neiman, a 
neurosurgeon, suggested that serial MRIs and neurological 
examinations can be used to detect types of brain cancer 
associated with exposure to vinyl chloride without 
explanation of their effectiveness or potential risk.  None of 
plaintiffs‟ experts addressed how medical monitoring would 
proceed.  Defendants‟ expert Peter Valberg, a toxicologist, 
maintained the negative health effects of screening may 
outweigh any potential benefits.  Another defense expert, 
Henry Friedman, a neuro-oncologist, contended a regime of 
serial MRIs would be contraindicated and potentially risky 
because the contrast agent used for MRIs poses dangers to 
those with kidney disease.  The court did not err in crediting 
defense experts‟ detailed discussions of why the medical 
monitoring regime would present individual rather than 
common issues.  See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 323 
(“Weighing conflicting expert testimony at the certification 
stage is not only permissible; it may be integral to the 
rigorous analysis Rule 23 demands.”). 
Plaintiffs‟ proposed common evidence and trial plan 
would not be able to prove the medical necessity of plaintiffs‟ 
proposed monitoring regime without further individual 
proceedings to consider class members‟ individual 
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characteristics and medical histories and to weigh the benefits 
and safety of a monitoring program.  Plaintiffs cannot show 
the cohesiveness required for certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) 
class.  The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
certify a class that would be able to resolve few if any issues 
that would materially advance resolution of the underlying 
claims.  
B. 
1. 
 Plaintiffs also sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3).  
The requirements of predominance and superiority
19
 for 
                                              
19Rule 23(b)(3) requires “that the questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  It 
lists factors relevant to the predominance and superiority 
requirements: 
(A) the class members‟ interests in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions;  
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation 
concerning the controversy already begun by or 
against class members;  
(C) the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum; and  
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class 
action. 
Id. 
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maintaining a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) are less 
stringent than the cohesiveness requirement of Rule 
23(b)(2).
20
  See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 143; In re St. Jude Med. 
Inc., 425 F.3d at 1121.  But the two inquiries are similar.  
“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether 
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant 
adjudication by representation.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.   
 Courts have generally denied certification of medical 
monitoring classes when individual questions involving 
causation and damages predominate over (and are more 
complex than) common issues such as whether defendants 
released the offending chemical into the environment.  See In 
re St. Jude Med., Inc., 522 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(reversing the decision to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class for 
“the highly individualized remedy of medical monitoring”); 
see generally 7AA Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, 
Mary Kay Kane & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 1782 (3d ed. 2005) (“[T]o the extent that 
different injuries are alleged to have occurred to different 
class members and over different periods of time, it is 
difficult to show that common issues predominate and that a 
class action would be superior.”).   
 As discussed, the inquiries into whether class members 
were exposed above background levels, whether class 
members face a significantly increased risk of developing a 
serious latent disease, and whether a medical monitoring 
regime is reasonably medically necessary all require 
considering individual proof of class members‟ specific 
                                              
20The parties do not address the court‟s findings that a class 
action would not be a superior method of adjudication.  In 
any event, we see no error here. 
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characteristics.  The court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding individual issues predominate over any issues 
common to the class. 
2. 
Plaintiffs contend an alternative class could have been 
certified.  They offer three possible modifications—only one 
of which they presented to the District Court.  Plaintiffs 
suggested in a footnote in their trial reply brief that, if their 
proposed common proof were insufficient, they could create 
isopleths measuring exposure in each calendar year.  The jury 
would then use these yearly isopleths to determine if 
residents‟ exposure levels in that year satisfied the elements 
of Pennsylvania‟s medical monitoring cause of action. 
The court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs‟ alternative 
class definition.  “A party‟s assurance to the court that it 
intends or plans to meet the requirements is insufficient.”  
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318 (citing Newton, 259 F.3d 
at 191).  “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard.  
A party seeking class certification must affirmatively 
demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must 
be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently 
numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”  
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2551.  “[A] district court 
errs as a matter of law when it fails to resolve a genuine legal 
or factual dispute relevant to determining the requirements.”  
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320.  Plaintiffs did not 
present yearly isopleths to the trial court, did not show such 
isopleths to be feasible given the limited data available, and 
did not explain how these yearly determinations would 
correspond to actual class members.   
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 On appeal, plaintiffs suggest for the first time two 
further refinements to their class definition.  Plaintiffs 
contend common issues would predominate if the class 
definition were (1) amended to include only class residents 
who lived in the village for the entire period represented by 
the isopleths presented to the trial court, or (2) amended to 
include only class members who lived in the village for an 
entire calendar year and yearly isopleths were created.  These 
alternatives are not properly before us, having never been 
presented to the trial court.  Even if we were to consider 
plaintiffs‟ arguments, their alternatives do not resolve the 
defects in the isopleths nor provide enough detail to 
determine how the claims of such a class would be tried. 
C. 
1. 
Plaintiffs also sought certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class of property owners who allegedly suffered loss in 
property values due to defendants‟ contamination under 
theories of public nuisance, private nuisance, strict liability, 
CERCLA, conspiracy, negligence, negligence per se, and 
trespass.  The court noted “[p]laintiffs rely on the same expert 
testimony that they offered to support their medical 
monitoring claim.”  Accordingly, it found common questions 
did not predominate over individual questions because 
“[a]lthough many aspects of [p]laintiffs‟ claims may be 
common questions, the parties agree that resolution of those 
questions leaves significant and complex questions 
unanswered, including questions relating to causation of 
contamination, extent of contamination, fact of damages, and 
amount of damages.” 
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The District Court properly explained its reasons for 
finding that individuals issues predominated over common 
issues.  Plaintiffs cannot fault the court for failing to examine 
each element of their purported causes of action when they 
failed to present arguments or propose common proof for 
each element.  As the arguments for certification of the 
property class relied on the same purported “common” 
evidence as the medical monitoring class, the court did not err 
by denying certification of the property damage class. 
The trial court properly considered and rejected the 
arguments plaintiffs did make.  Plaintiffs rely on other 
instances of property contamination where the courts found 
common issues predominated.  But those cases presented 
simpler theories of contamination or discrete incidents of 
contamination.  In Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp., 319 
F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003), the plaintiffs alleged the improper 
handling of chemicals contaminated the soil and groundwater 
beneath their properties.  The court certified an issue class on 
the defendant‟s negligence and the extent of contamination 
but left damages to be resolved individually.  But the Seventh 
Circuit, in affirming the order certifying the class, noted the 
question of the “geographical scope of the contamination” 
was “not especially complex.”  Id. at 912.   
Similarly, in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 
F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs alleged groundwater 
contamination that could be discovered merely by testing 
local wells.  Id. at 1193.  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
certification order but noted a class action is only suited for 
situations when “the cause of the disaster is a single course of 
conduct which is identical for each of the plaintiffs.”  Id. at 
1197.  The court warned:   
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In complex, mass, toxic tort accidents, where no 
one set of operative facts establishes liability, 
no single proximate cause equally applies to 
each potential class member and each 
defendant, and individual issues outnumber 
common issues, the district court should 
properly question the appropriateness of a class 
action for resolving the controversy. 
Id.  Not all claims of property damage based on exposure are 
alike.  Single instances or simple theories of contamination 
may be more apt for consolidated proceedings than extensive 
periods of contamination with multiple sources and various 
pathways.  See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 435, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(certifying class for damage to property from water 
contamination but noting “[c]ourts have repeatedly drawn 
distinctions between proposed classes involving a single 
incident or single source of harm and proposed classes 
involving multiple sources of harm occurring over time”);  
Reilly v. Gould, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 588, 602 (M.D. Pa. 1997) 
(noting in refusing to certify a property damage class “it is the 
presence of additional individualized factors affecting 
individual plaintiffs which wreaks havoc on the notion that all 
plaintiffs‟ injuries have been caused solely by the defendant‟s 
actions”). 
Here, plaintiffs contend varied levels of vinylidene 
chloride at various times seeped into a shallow aquifer, 
degraded into vinyl chloride, diffused from the aquifer to the 
ground above, and evaporated into the air to be carried over 
the village.  Given the potential difference in contamination 
on the properties, common issues do not predominate.  Cf. 
Fisher v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 238 F.R.D. 273, 305 
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n.70 (S.D. Ala. 2006) (“[A] property-by-property inquiry will 
unquestionably be necessary to determine whether that source 
and that pathway have any bearing on the experience of a 
particular property owner within the Proposed Class Area.”).  
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the 
property damage class members‟ individual issues 
predominated over the issues common to the class. 
2. 
 Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that, even if common 
issues do not predominate, the court should have certified an 
“issue only” class on liability.  The court found an issue class 
was not feasible and would not advance the resolution of 
class members‟ claims.  The court noted both the fact of 
damages and the amount of damages “would remain 
following the class-wide determination of any common 
issues,” and further that causation and extent of 
contamination would need to be determined at follow-up 
proceedings.  Due to the numerous individual issues that 
would remain, the court declined to certify a liability-only 
class. 
 “[A] court‟s decision to exercise its discretion under 
Rule 23(c)(4),[
21
] like any other certification determination 
under Rule 23, must be supported by rigorous analysis.” 
Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 200-01 
(3d Cir. 2009).  Rule 23(c)(4) “both imposes a duty on the 
court to insure that only those questions which are appropriate 
for class adjudication be certified, and gives it ample power to 
                                              
21Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) states:  “Particular Issues. When 
appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a 
class action with respect to particular issues.”   
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„treat common things in common and to distinguish the 
distinguishable.‟”  Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 267 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 
35 (5th Cir. 1968)).  “The interaction between the 
requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) 
and the authorization of issue classes under Rule 23(c)(4) is a 
difficult matter that has generated divergent interpretations 
among the courts.”  Hohider, 574 F.3d at 200 n.25. 
Courts have disagreed over the extent to which the 
ability to certify issue classes alters the predominance 
requirement.  Some appellate courts have viewed Rule 
23(c)(4) as a “housekeeping rule” allowing common issues to 
be certified only when the cause of action, taken as a whole, 
meets the predominance requirement.  See Castano v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996).  Others 
have allowed certification of issue classes even if common 
questions do not predominate for the cause of action as a 
whole.  See In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 
F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2006); Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., 
Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 439 (4th Cir. 2003); Valentino v. Carter-
Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996).  We noted 
the split of authority in Hohider.  574 F.3d at 200 & n.25.    
The District Court here found “resolution of [common] 
questions leaves significant and complex questions 
unanswered.”  We agree, as the common issues here are not 
divisible from the individual issues.  See Hohider, 574 F.3d at 
200 n.25.  Following Hohider, the District Court conducted a 
rigorous analysis on the effect “partial certification would 
have on the class action going forward.”  Id. at 202.  In 
Hohider, we provided relevant considerations on when a 
district court may wish to carve at the joints to form issue 
classes and cited the ALI‟s Proposed Final Draft of the 
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Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.  The ALI‟s 
final draft preserved and expanded its discussion of these 
important considerations.  See Principles of the Law of 
Aggregate Litigation §§ 2.02-05, 2.07-2.08 (2010). 
Rather than joining either camp in the circuit 
disagreement, we believe the considerations set forth in 
Hohider and more recently in the Final Draft of the ALI‟s 
Principles of Aggregate Litigation provide the most sound 
guidance in resolving this complicated area of class action 
procedure.   
In light of the adoption of the Final Draft of the 
Principles of Aggregate Litigation, when deciding whether or 
not to certify an issue class, the trial court should consider: 
the type of claim(s) and issue(s) in question; the overall 
complexity of the case; the efficiencies to be gained by 
granting partial certification in light of realistic procedural 
alternatives; the substantive law underlying the claim(s), 
including any choice-of-law questions it may present and 
whether the substantive law separates the issue(s) from other 
issues concerning liability or remedy; the impact partial 
certification will have on the constitutional and statutory 
rights of both the class members and the defendant(s); the 
potential preclusive effect or lack thereof that resolution of 
the proposed issue class will have; the repercussions 
certification of an issue(s) class will have on the effectiveness 
and fairness of resolution of remaining issues; the impact 
individual proceedings may have upon one another, including 
whether remedies are indivisible such that granting or not 
granting relief to any claimant as a practical matter 
determines the claims of others; and the kind of evidence 
presented on the issue(s) certified and potentially presented 
on the remaining issues, including the risk subsequent triers 
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of fact will need to reexamine evidence and findings from 
resolution of the common issue(s).  See Principles of the Law 
of Aggregate Litigation §§ 2.02-05 (2010); Hohider, 574 F.3d 
at 201.  This non-exclusive list of factors should guide courts 
as they apply Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) “to „treat common 
things in common and to distinguish the distinguishable.‟”  
Chiang, 385 F.3d at 256  (quoting Jenkins, 400 F.2d at 35). 
When certifying an issue class the court should clearly 
enumerate the issue(s) to be tried as a class as required by 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B).  See Wachtel v. Guardian Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2006).  It 
should also explain how class resolution of the issue(s) will 
fairly and efficiently advance the resolution of class 
members‟ claims, including resolution of remaining issues.  
See Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation §§ 2.02(e) 
(2010).  
The trial court here did not abuse its discretion by 
declining to certify a liability-only issue class when it found 
liability inseverable from other issues that would be left for 
follow-up proceedings.  Nor did the court err in finding no 
marked division between damages and liability.  
Plaintiffs have neither defined the scope of the 
liability-only trial nor proposed what common proof would be 
presented.
22
  The claims and issues here are complex and 
                                              
22
Plaintiffs appear to rely on the same purported common 
proof used for the medical monitoring class.  But the common 
evidence presented for the medical monitoring class shows 
present levels of contamination to be very low, undercutting 
the claims of the class seeking damages for present 
contamination of their property.   
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common issues do not easily separate from individual issues.  
A trial on whether the defendants discharged vinlydine 
chloride into the lagoon that seeped in the shallow aquifer and 
whether the vinyl chloride evaporated from the air from the 
shallow aquifer is unlikely to substantially aid resolution of 
the substantial issues on liability and causation. 
Certification of a liability-only issue class may unfairly 
impact defendants and absent class members.  Plaintiffs‟ bald 
assertion that class members claims share “the same nucleus 
of operative facts” is a mere “assurance to the court that it 
intends or plans to meet the requirements.”  Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318 (citing Newton, 259 F.3d at 191).  
Plaintiffs appear to rely on the same “common” evidence 
used for the medical monitoring class, but fail to explain how 
their estimates of exposure to residents over substantial 
periods of time corresponds to the level of contamination 
currently present at each home.  It may prejudice absent class 
members whose properties may be shown to have suffered 
greater contamination.
23
   
Given the inability to separate common issues from 
issues where individual characteristics may be determinative, 
                                              
23
Cf. Boughton, 65 F.3d at 827 n.1 (“[W]here, as here, there 
are multiple types of claims, more than one form of relief 
sought and the parties disagree about the number of models 
necessary to deal with the various ways in which properties 
may have become contaminated it may not be so simple as to 
err on the side of certification just to keep the option open 
because there may be mutually exclusive ways of defining 
subclasses and any attempt to certify subclasses before it is 
clear what the common issues are carries with it the potential 
for making the case less manageable.”) 
39 
 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
certify a liability-only property damage class.  
III. 
For the foregoing reasons the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs‟ motion for class 
certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3).  We 
will affirm its judgment. 
